

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 03244 01 OF 02 012041Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 DOEE-00 /026 W
-----078445 012056Z /63
O 011901Z MAR 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6636
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 03244

EXDIS USCTB

PASS TO DOE

E.O.11652:XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS:KEY ELEMENTS AND ICC ISSUES

CTB MESSAGE NO.154

REFS: (A) GENEVA 1678 (CTB NO.114)
(B) GENEVA 2504 (CTB NO.143)
(C) STATE 49670 (CTB NO.9)

1. THIS MESSAGE RESPONDS TO WASHINGTON'S QUERIES (REF C)
REGARDING SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD THE FORMAT OF THE
TRILATERAL INITIATIVE AND TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL CON-
SULTATIVE COMMISSION (ICC).

2. ON THE FORMAT QUESTION, PRESENT SITUATION IS THAT ALL
THREE DELEGATIONS AGREE THAT THE PRECISE FORM OF THE
TRILATERAL INITIATIVE CAN BE DETERMINED AT A LATER STAGE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 03244 01 OF 02 012041Z

OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. MOROKHOV INDICATED APPROVAL OF THIS
APPROACH ON FEB 2 (REF A) AND LATER GAVE HIS EXPLICIT
SUPPORT FOR IT AT HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING FEB 6
(CTB NO.117). SUBSEQUENTLY, SOVIET ALT REP (TIMERBAEV)
TOLD US ALT REP (NEIDLE) THAT, AT LATER STAGE, THREE DELS
COULD EXPLORE FULLY WHICH APPROACH WAS THE BEST FOR THE
PROJECT AND THAT THE QUESTION WOULD BE RESOLVED ON THE

MERITS. SINCE THIS COMMON UNDERSTANDING WAS REACHED ON DEFERRAL, THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE NO EFFORT TO PERSUADE US OF THE DESIRABILITY OF SUBMITTING A COMPLETE TREATY TEXT.

3. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ABANDONED THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE ELEMENTS APPROACH, OR EVEN THAT THEY NOW HAVE AN OPEN MIND (AND THERE IS A QUESTION ABOUT THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ROLE OF THE CCD, SEE CTB NO.155). IN FACT, WE DOUBT IF THE SOVIETS HAVE ALTERED THEIR EARLIER STRONG PREFERENCE FOR SUBMITTING A COMPLETE TREATY TEXT TO THE CCD.

4. THIS BASIC SITUATION WAS REFLECTED IN MOROKHOV'S REMARKS ON FEB 2. AS REPORTED IN REF A, MOROKHOV ASSERTED AT THAT MEETING THAT SOVIET DEL DID NOT SEE A CLEAR BOUNDARY IN US APPROACH BETWEEN VERIFICATION PROVISIONS OF MULTILATERAL AND SEPARATE AGREEMENTS. REASON FOR CONFUSION, HE CLAIMED, WAS VAGUE AND INCOMPLETE NATURE OF US PROPOSALS TO DATE, ESPECIALLY REGARDING MULTILATERAL TREATY. WARNKE RESPONDED THAT US VIEWS ON MULTILATERAL TREATY WERE SET FORTH IN US WORKING PAPER OF DEC 7, ALTHOUGH HE POINTED OUT THAT CERTAIN PROVISIONS (SUCH AS REGARDING INITIATION OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS AND DATA EXCHANGE) HAD BEEN LEFT "SKETCHY" IN US PAPER BECAUSE DECISIONS HAD NOT YET BEEN TAKEN ON THOSE MATTERS. IN ANY EVENT, OSI PROVISIONS OF MULTILATERAL TREATY WOULD
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 03244 01 OF 02 012041Z

APPEAR SKETCHY COMPARED TO OSI PROVISIONS OF SEPARATE AGREEMENT, BECAUSE LATTER WOULD GO INTO MUCH GREATER DETAIL. MOROKHOV SHOT BACK THAT IF THE US WANTED TO HAND "KEY ELEMENTS" TO THE CCD, THIS WOULD BE WITHOUT PARTICIPATION OF THE SOVIET UNION. SOVIET SIDE WANTED TO WORK OUT A TREATY, NOT JUST BRING POSITIONS CLOSER BY DISCUSSING THEM. SOVIET DEL HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO WORK OUT A TREATY, NOT GENERAL PROVISIONS OF KEY ELEMENTS. THIS WAS A POSITION OF PRINCIPLE.

5. FROM THE CONTEXT, IT WAS CLEAR THAT MOROKHOV'S REMARKS WERE NOT A CONSIDERED SOVIET PRESENTATION ON THE FORMAT ISSUE. INSTEAD, HIS RESPONSE, WHICH WAS DELIVERED IN AN EMOTIONAL AND SPUR-OF-THE-MOMENT MANNER, SEEMED TO BE A REACTION TO WHAT HE PROBABLY MISCONSTRUED AS OUR INTENTION TO SUBMIT VAGUE AND "SKETCHY" FORMULATIONS FOR THE MULTILATERAL TREATY. WHAT SPECIFICALLY PROVOKED HIM WAS NOT SO MUCH THE KEY ELEMENTS APPROACH ITSELF, BUT RATHER HIS FEAR THAT THE APPROACH INVOLVED OVERLY GENERAL FORMULATIONS. OF COURSE, ONCE HIS CONCERN WAS TRIGGERED, IT LED TO A RESTATEMENT OF THE STANDING SOVIET LINE ON THE FORMAT ISSUE, WITH MOROKHOV'S CHARACTERISTIC RHETORICAL OVERKILL.

IN ANY EVENT, WHEN WARNKE SUGGESTED THAT A RESOLUTION OF THE FORMAT ISSUE BE PUT OFF UNTIL THE END OF THE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, MOROKHOV INDICATED HIS AGREEMENT.

6. WE BELIEVE THAT DEFERRING THE FORMAT ISSUE IS TACTICALLY DESIRABLE FOR US. IF WE LATER DECIDE THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH THE COMPLETE TREATY APPROACH, WE SHOULD PLAY THAT CARD AT A TIME WHEN IT COULD BE USED TO EXTRACT SOMETHING FROM THE SOVIETS. IN THE MEANTIME, LEAVING THE QUESTION OF FORMAT OPEN WILL NOT IMPEDE PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT. WE THERE-

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 03244 02 OF 02 012041Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 DOEE-00 /026 W
-----078465 012058Z /63

O 011901Z MAR 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6637
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 03244

EXDIS, USCTB

PASS DOE

FORE DO NOT FEEL THAT IT IS NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE TO PURSUE THE FORMAT ISSUE FURTHER AT THIS TIME OR TO INDICATE THAT WE ARE NOW TAKING A MORE RELAXED APPROACH.

7. ON QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (ICC), STRONG STATEMENTS BY SOVIET DEL (SUCH AS REPORTED IN REF B) REFLECT LONG-STANDING SOVIET OPPOSITION TO GIVING INTERNATIONAL BODIES AND THIRD PARTIES ANY ROLE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF ARMS CONTROL TREATIES, EVEN MULTILATERAL TREATIES. WE, ON THE OTHER HAND, CONTINUE TO SEE MERIT IN CREATING A MULTILATERAL ICC FOR THE CTB WITH LIMITED POWERS. ALTHOUGH SUCH A BODY WOULD CONTRIBUTE LITTLE TO US VERIFICATION NEEDS (GIVEN THE VERIFICATION MEASURES AND THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION THAT WILL BE PROVIDED FOR IN THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT),

IT WOULD HAVE SEVERAL POLITICAL BENEFITS. BY GIVING NON-NUCLEAR STATES SOME IMPLEMENTATION FORUM, IT WOULD TEND TO DEFLECT CRITICISM FROM THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT AND ITS JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, IN WHICH WE PLACE MUCH GREATER IMPORTANCE. IN ADDITION, REGARDING THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 03244 02 OF 02 012041Z

POSSIBILITY OF HARRASSING OSI REQUESTS FROM OTHER STATES (A SOVIET PRE-OCCUPATION), THE ICC WOULD PROVIDE A FORUM WHERE UNSUBSTANTIATED CONCERNS BY VARIOUS NON-NUCLEAR STATES COULD BE DISCUSSED AND LAID TO REST WITHOUT THE NEED FOR AN OSI REQUEST. WITHOUT SUCH A SAFETY VALVE, FRIVOLOUS OSI REQUESTS ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE LAUNCHED WITHOUT WARNING OR DISCUSSION, THUS CREATING UNNECESSARY INTERNATIONAL PUBLICITY AND CONTROVERSY.

8. OF MOST IMPORTANCE, BY GIVING NON-NUCLEAR STATES WHAT THEY WOULD REGARD AS A MEANINGFUL ROLE IN CTB IMPLEMENTATION, IT WOULD MAKE THE OVERALL TREATY REGIME MORE ATTRACTIVE TO THEM AND INCREASE THE PROSPECTS FOR BROAD ADHERENCE. INDEED, GIVEN THE POSITIONS THAT A NUMBER OF INFLUENTIAL NON-NUCLEAR STATES (E.G., FRG, SWEDEN, NETHERLANDS) HAVE TAKEN TOWARD MULTILATERAL CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS, WE WOULD EXPECT STRONG RESISTANCE IN THE CCD TO THE IDEA THAT THERE SHOULD NOT BE SOME FORM OF ICC.

9. THE ICC PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN OUR DEC 7 WORKING PAPER WAS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE THESE BENEFITS BY PROVIDING FOR A REASONABLE AND APPROPRIATE ROLE FOR NON-NUCLEAR STATES IN CTB IMPLEMENTATION, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME AVOIDING THE POSSIBILITY OF ABUSES THAT NEITHER WE NOR THE SOVIETS COULD TOLERATE. IN PARTICULAR, BY STRICTLY LIMITING THE COMMISSION'S MANDATE AND PRESCRIBING THAT IT OPERATE BY CONSENSUS, WE HAVE TRIED TO ENSURE THAT THE ICC WOULD NOT BE EMPOWERED TO MAKE A DETERMINATION WHETHER OR NOT A PARTY IS LIVING UP TO ITS OBLIGATIONS.

10. DESPITE THE UTILITY WE SEE IN HAVING AN ICC, WE BELIEVE THAT DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN US AND THE SOVIETS ON THE ISSUE SHOULD NOT BLOCK OR EVEN SIGNIFICANTLY DELAY
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 03244 02 OF 02 012041Z

A TRILATERAL INITIATIVE. WE SHOULD BE PREPARED, IF NECESSARY, TO SEND THE TRILATERAL INITIATIVE FORWARD TO THE CCD WITHOUT A PROVISION FOR AN ICC. IN THAT CASE, THE SOVIETS WOULD COME UNDER GREAT PRESSURE FROM THE

NON-NUCLEARS TO ACCEPT AN ICC AND THEY MIGHT EVENTUALLY COMPROMISE, PERHAPS ALONG THE LINES OF THE RESTRICTED MANDATE WE HAVE PROPOSED. WHILE WE WOULD OBVIOUSLY WANT TO ENCOURAGE THE SOVIETS TO BE REASONABLE IN REACHING AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE NON-NUCLEARS, OUR BASIC OBJECTIVES WOULD NOT, IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, BE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED IF NO FORM OF ICC COULD BE NEGOTIATED.

11. SHOULD WE DECIDE NOT TO INSIST ON PROVIDING FOR AN ICC IN THE TRILATERAL INITIATIVE, IT IS IMPORTANT -- AS IN THE CASE OF THE ELEMENTS APPROACH -- THAT WE DO SO AT A TIME AND IN A MANNER THAT BUYS THE MOST FOR OUR MOVE. WE THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT IT SHOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO CONTINUE WITH OUR PRESENT POSITION AND TO CONSIDER A SHIFT, IF NECESSARY, AT A LATER STAGE. WARNKE

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic DecapTIONing: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NEGOTIATIONS, ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 01 mar 1978
DecapTION Date: 20 Mar 2014
DecapTION Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978GENEVA03244
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X3
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780094-0439
Format: TEL
From: GENEVA
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t197803120/aaaadykx.tel
Line Count: 239
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 9acdd1ba-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 78 GENEVA 1678, 78 GENEVA 2504, 78 STATE 49670
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 10 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3160139
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CTB NEGOTIATIONS:KEY ELEMENTS AND ICC ISSUES CTB MESSAGE NO.154
TAGS: PARM, US, UK, UR
To: STATE EPT OF ENERGY
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/9acdd1ba-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014